

Superdiversity: Diverging Demographics and The Populist Surge

Introduction.

Western Democracies have seen a rise in populism in recent years. This has come at the same time as large demographic changes, particularly in education and migration. The paper explores the link between these demographic changes and the rise in populism. This is done in two sections. The first section addresses the debate between the cultural backlash thesis and the financial hardship thesis as explanations of the root causes of populism. This section shows that whilst cultural backlash thesis explains the root causes of populism, populism also needs to be activated by a threat. Often these threats come as economic shocks (Rodrik, 2017) meaning the financial hardship thesis is also relevant. On this basis, this section puts forward the argument that both theses need to be used in conjunction with each other in order to fully understand why support for populism increases (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018)

The second section of this paper will build on this finding to show how populism has increased in the US and UK. These are two advanced liberal democracies that have seen an increase populism (Spicer, 2018) This paper will focus on the events leading up to the Trump election and the Brexit vote in 2016 and argue that populism increased in these countries prior to the events. This is due to the wide range of literature on these events, both of which are often put down to a right-wing populist surge in the countries. (Bachman and Sidaway, 2016; Browning, 2019). This will be done by focusing on the formation of 'superdiverse cities' such as London, New York and Los Angeles. Changes to education and ethnic diversity in both countries have caused these cities to become global hubs of business, culture and politics but are also very multicultural and socially liberal areas. This section will show how a convergence of the well-educated has caused populism to arise through a clash of this liberal agenda and the more traditional views of the rest of the population. This section will also examine how this convergence has exacerbated the decline of the working class that was started by deindustrialisation of these areas.

The increasing migration to the UK and US is also examined. These superdiverse cities are disproportionately the areas that immigrants flock to. This increasing minority population causes the white majorities to feel under threat as their numbers decline. This can lead to an increase in ethnocentrism in the indigenous population (Jardina, 2019). The reasons for this, and the pattern of this ethnocentrism is analysed in this section. From this I

conclude that both the centralisation of the well-educated and the increasing minority population in these superdiverse cities form converging and reinforcing cleavages that mean the increasing ethnocentrism and populism are mutually beneficial.

Populism: Examining the root cause

This first section of the paper will address the academic debate between the cultural backlash thesis and the financial hardship thesis as explanations of the root causes of populism. Defining populism ‘as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2004, p543) this section will set out the case that populism is too complex an ideology to be fully explained by either cultural backlash thesis or financial hardship thesis solely. Instead, both schools of thought should be used with each other to fully understand what causes populism to spread. The focus will specifically be on nationalistic populism as, although populism comes in many forms, this is the one that is most affected by social demographic change (as I will show in the second section). However, I will take evidence from studies that examine populism in several arenas to explain the causes of populism with universal applications rather than in specific conditions.

The causes of populism will be addressed in two sections. The first part will show that non-economic factors are more likely to cause support for populism to increase. This part will show that the rise of identity politics, caused by increasing post-materialism from prosperity, has created a greater awareness of the differences in cultures between groups (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). With this greater awareness has come increased antagonism between groups. As the second half of this paper will look at how social demographic change influences populism, this part will deal with cultural backlash thesis in quite an abstract way. When I examine the role of social demography, I will place cultural backlash thesis into specific contexts.

However, this populist sentiment often needs an activating event to turn the discontent from latent grievances into active support (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). It is on this basis that whilst cultural backlash suitably explains the root causes of populism- financial hardship thesis explains the timing of populist surges- as Fetzer (2019) shows. Therefore, economic hardship is often a strong predictor of support for a populist movement despite not being the root cause of it. On this basis, the first section of this paper will conclude that both theses are necessary to fully understand what causes populist support and what may cause it to increase.

The Cultural Backlash Thesis

From Mudde's (2004, p543) definition, the dichotomy between the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' shows an inherent moral quality to populism's ideology. Whilst also stating that the cultural backlash thesis can only be applied to nativist populism, (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017) as this is the focus of this paper, it does not matter if this is the only type of populism that it can be applied to. This moral quality to populism shows that it is a fundamentally a cultural conflict rather than one based purely on economic hardship (Plattner, 2010). Inglehart and Norris (2016) show this to be the case. In their study of 31 European countries, they show that increasing economic prosperity has led to a convergence on economic issues across the political spectrum, causing post-material issues to become more salient. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) cite this economic convergence as a cause for populism.

This convergence has also come with a professionalisation of politics (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). Increasingly elected representatives in western democracies come from similar educational backgrounds and ideological positions (Singh, 2017; Mudde, 2004) leaving the masses underrepresented (Oliver and Rahn, 2016). This is the same core group that makes up the identity liberals (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020; Abreu and Öner, 2020). Stances on political issues are increasingly divided between the progressive and the conservative positions. Therefore, social conservatives are increasingly at odds with the policies that their representatives support. This causes disenfranchisement and anti-establishment sentiment to rise. This sentiment allows populist support to rise as those disenfranchised by mainstream parties increasingly seek methods which voice their frustration.

Analysis of the Brexit referendum shows this to be the case. Those who were first time voters for UKIP in the 2015 general election voted for the Conservative Party in 2010. However, they also tended to be first time Conservative voters in 2010, having defected from labour since the 2005 general election (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020, p176). This is evidence of increasing disenfranchisement with the mainstream political parties. Voting for UKIP and the Brexit referendum were for them a chance to 'take back control' as the official Vote 'Leave' slogan said. Browning (2019) supports this, arguing that it was a chance for the conservatives to fight back against the 'out of touch metropolitan liberal elite' (p228). As has been widely reported, those who voted for Brexit tended to be white, older, living in a rural

area and have fewer qualifications than those who voted for Remain (Abreu and Öner, 2020; Browning, 2019, Cox, 2017).

Across western democracies, this cohort is decreasing as education levels increase (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2013) From 1990 to 2014, the levels of tertiary education in the EU more than doubled. It is well-known that a university education can lead to a better job, higher wage and increased standard of living. However, the qualitative effects of a university education should not be overlooked. There is academic consensus (Abreu and Öner, 2020; Sobolewska and Ford 2020) that a university experience generally causes students to have more socially progressive views and a more globalised world view. This isn't due to universities changing their perspectives, but that more progressive people tend to go to university and live in cities (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). Due to the superdiversity of these environments, their views are only intensified. Those who don't go to university tend not to see the world at their fingertips in the same way; the ideas that their parents brought them up on don't experience the same challenges as those of the parents whose children go to university. As such they tend to, at the risk of generalising, be more socially conservative.

Populism has risen as the conflict between the socially progressives and the socially conservatives has increased. Affirmative action policies from social progressives (Lynch, 2019) combined with a vilification as they claim to be the moral elite (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) antagonises the socially conservative. Highly skilled workers flock to high value areas (Spicer, 2018). Incidentally, these areas are dynamic cities that have benefitted from globalisation and are also more diverse areas. They tend to be university educated so are more progressive than those who live in rural areas. Social conservatives look at urban hubs, with dynamic economies and a melting pot of different groups and cultures and see themselves marginalised to the side (Hochschild, 2017; Cox, 2017). Therefore, populism stems from a clash of cultures, the clash between the socially progressive and the socially conservative.

Financial hardship thesis: Populism needs to be activated

Whilst the previous part showed that populism's root cause is caused by a clash of cultures between social progressives and social conservatives, populism is not independent of economic factors. Indeed, this part will argue that economic factors are often necessary as activations for populist sentiment. Whilst populism requires a certain level of economic prosperity to increase the saliency of post-material issues, (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018)

high levels of economic inequality can be the activation required to spark widespread populist support. Academic research has shown that often populist support requires an existential threat to cause it (Fetzer, 2019; Carreras et al., 2019). Fetzer's analysis of the Brexit vote showed that UKIP vote grew the most where the austerity cuts starting in 2010 were the sharpest. The next paragraphs will set out the case that whilst financial hardship thesis does not explain the root causes of populism, at least the nationalist populism this paper is concerned with, it is still useful as an explanation of the surges in populist support, we have witnessed in recent times. It also serves as a good predictor about which areas may be preconditioned to support populism.

That populism is an ideology that needs to be activated with in a population is not immediately obvious. However, the disenfranchisement that is necessary for populism causes less interaction with the political system, such as voting (Greven, 2016) this necessity becomes clearer. Inglehart and Norris (2017) stating that whilst populism may be rooted in cultural backlash, it is often triggered by economic causes. Whilst some academics see populism as an ideology that looks 'upwards but also down upon an out group' (Singh, 2017, p24) there is greater consensus that populism is instead in response to a threat. This threat, generally coming in the form of economic hardship, is the spark needed to cause disenfranchised voters to act and show their discontent at the ballot box, often surprising mainstream political parties (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020; Fetzer, 2019).

However, it does not appear to be an individual's economic situation that causes them to lend their support to populism, rather that of their area or group. Regional level statistics are more statistically significant than individual level statistics when looking at the relationship between economic hardship and populist support (Carreras et al., 2019). Indeed, Colantone and Stanig (2018), show that the greater a region is falling behind in comparison to the rest of a country, the more likely the greater the support for Brexit in the referendum. Other researchers that have examined the link between regional economic hardship and populism across several different countries have found that this phenomenon does not occur solely in the UK. Jardina (2019) shows that perceived group threat in the US is more significant than individual wealth in strengthening feelings of in-group solidarity and hostile towards out groups. Jardina also shows that this threat does not need to be real; a perception of threat is enough to cause this to occur.

Vulnerability to economic shocks increases the likeliness of seeing other social groups as threats (Rodrik, 2018). Rodrik's article puts forward that populism is caused by these economic shocks, and that it is simply expressed through cultural backlash theory. Whilst this explanation omits a reason for why populism is expressed along cultural boundaries rather than others, class for example, he is not wrong that vulnerability to economic shocks can be the activation that populism can require. A tendency to see growth in zero sum terms (Carreras et al., 2019) means that different groups are often seen as the cause of problems instead of part of the solution as globalists do. Economic shocks also reduce social trust (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2018) which has been shown to intensify pre-existing feelings of racial resentment. (Herreros and Criado, 2009). Therefore, whilst economic hardship may not be the root cause of populism, it is a powerful intensifier of populist tendencies; the thesis explains the populist surges that often occur in a period of economic decline or stagnation.

This section has addressed the debate between the two main schools of thought about the causes of populism. The aim of this section was to show that the cultural backlash thesis and the financial hardship thesis should not be used on their own. Instead, both should be used in conjunction with each other to fully understand why populism occurs. This section has focussed on nativist populism, as this type of populism is, as I will show in the next section, heavily influenced by social demographic change. I first addressed the cultural backlash thesis, the idea that it is a clash of cultures that is the root cause of populism. This has been caused by the increasing saliency of post-material issues (Inglehart and Norris, 2017) and a 'divergence in regional development' and diversity (Spicer, 2018, p119). This raises the awareness of the differences between social progressives and social conservatives and increased the antagonism between them.

I then addressed the financial hardship thesis. This is the notion that economic shocks or stagnation can cause anti-establishmentarianism and nativism to grow. This then causes populism. Whilst this thesis does not adequately explain how this occurs, it is still useful as an explanation of populist surges. Support for populism often needs to be activated within society (Greven, 2016) and economic shocks, commonly, are this activation. Whilst they may not cause populist support, they intensify the pre-existing support (Herreros and Criado, 2009). Therefore, when combined with the cultural backlash thesis, the financial hardship thesis is useful for fully explaining surges of nativist populism in western democracies. In the second part of this paper will show that this nativist populism is also influenced by social

demographic change. This is due to it increasing the saliency of identity politics and ethnocentrism in turn causing the hostility between social conservatives and social progressives to increase.

Superdiverse cities and changing demographics

This second part of my paper analyses the ways that demographic change has influenced the spread of populism. This will be done by looking at how two different changes to the social demography have created 'superdiverse cities' such as New York and London (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020; Berg, 2013). These cities are hubs of young, diverse, well-educated and liberal people (Jennings and Stoker, 2018) that are drawn to and benefit from their vibrancy. Those that live and work in these superdiverse hubs see themselves as the moral elite and vilify those that are at odds with their beliefs (Browning, 2018; Cox, 2017; Coleman 2016). This has created a divergence between rural areas that are much more homogenous than these diverse hubs (Browning, 2019). Those that live either in rural areas or smaller towns and cities that have not morphed into these hubs tend to be much more conservative and traditional in their thinking (Sobolewska and Ford 2019).

The divergence between the superdiverse cities and the rest of the country they reside in has caused antagonism and ideological conflict to grow. This has allowed populism to gain footholds in these societies (Jennings and Stoker, 2018). This will be examined in two parts. The first part will analyse the convergence of the well-educated, those with a bachelor's degree or more, on these superdiverse cities. It will be shown that this has caused ideological differences to become geographical cleavages, as more people with liberal outlooks converge, those who are more traditional see these hubs as full of young, liberal professionals who antagonise and patronise them for their worldview (Robertson, 2021). Increasingly this new professional class, from which more and more of the political class stem, no longer represents society, either in their characteristics or their attitudes (Spicer, 2018). This causes antagonism and conflict between the traditional and the conservative to grow.

The second part will examine how immigration has created this divergence, and as a result increased the spread of populism. In recent decades, migration to western democracies has increased (Coleman, 2016; Major et al., 2018) and this migration has disproportionately gone to the cities (Abreu and Öner, 2020). This has increased the diversity and multiculturalism of the cities. Whilst many in the city welcome this increase in cultures and celebrate it, this is not the case for those who do not live in these areas. Instead, they see this

increase in cultures as confusing, frightening and as a threat to their own culture. The mechanisms of this will be examined. As such, people who display negative views about immigration and diversity vote support campaigns that promise to return society to a time when it was more homogenous and less threatening (Browning, 2018; Major et al., 2018) Such campaigns are often populist.

This part will look at two countries in depth where this diverging diversity has resulted in populism increasing: the US and UK. Both countries are advanced western democracies with, as mentioned above 'superdiverse' cities. They are also two countries where populist movements have seen 'an outright success' (Spicer, 2018, p116) in the Brexit vote and Trump's election in 2016 according to many academics (Bachman and Sidaway, 2016; Browning, 2018). This article will not examine the events themselves directly, however, it will examine the demographic changes to these societies in the years prior to them to try and provide a further theoretical explanation as to why they happened.

Superdiverse cities, converging education and the working class.

The educational cleavage is a growing one that is directly related to the spread of populism (Robertson, 2021). This is due to the convergence of the young on superdiverse cities that have benefitted from globalisation. Examples of these cities include London, New York, Washington D.C. and Los Angeles and many others. Through globalisation, these areas have become hubs of commerce, banking and politics making jobs widely available (Clarke and Newman, 2017). This in turn attracts younger, well-educated people with a liberal outlook, as highly skilled workers migrate to where their skills are most valued (Spicer, 2018). These people have spent their impressionable years in a highly progressive environment, being exposed to new ideas and experiences that challenged their pre-existing world view, and generally embrace diversity (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). The effect that this has on young people should not be underestimated. Abreu and Öner (2020) argue that this causes younger people to adopt a more progressive worldview, where everyone is allowed to be themselves without restriction. Whilst each new generation is more progressive than the previous one, the rising salience of post material issues combined with this convergence has intensified this push for equality and fairness. This has caused a conflict not because the more conservative hold racist views (or at least views they see as racist) but that often they think affirmative actions that have already taken place has solved most issues surrounding inequality in society (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020).

This new urban and professional class, however, think differently. Their views are increasingly progressive (Robertson, 2021; Browning 2018) and there is an increasing tendency to vilify those that disagree with their views (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). This professional class are increasingly making up the political class too. 85% of the current House of Commons went to university (Studee, 2019) and only 17 of the 530 members of the Houses of Congress don't have a degree (Duffin, 2021). This means that politicians are increasingly no longer representative of the places they represent. As Spicer (2018) argues, nearly all politicians are more similar to each other than they are to their constituents. As such, policy proposals are increasingly liberal and champion diversity. Whilst the population outside the hubs are not opposed to an equal and fair society, it's the pace of these policies that makes them cautious (Neal et al., 2021). They are also opposed to the derogatory and patronising nature of the moral elites (Gusterson, 2017; Robertson, 2021). This perception of the moral elites causes anti-establishment and bitterness towards the political class, which in turn allows for populism to grow.

This convergence of the well-educated has contributed to the demise of the working class. The effects this has had on these smaller towns and rural areas is profound. Just as Neal et al., (2021) point to the fact that communities form around farms, communities formed around mines and factories (Clarke and Newman, 2017). The loss of industry to globalisation has caused these communities to break down (Neal et al., 2021). Hochschild (2017) supports this, illustrating how many members of the working class in Louisiana went left school being told that if they learnt a trade, they could use it for the rest of their life. Globalisation has changed this, the global supply chain has moved jobs abroad for this section of society, but more importantly it has taken the community with it. Hochschild goes on to show that this breakdown in community has been attributed to globalisation, prompting a nationalist backlash. Populist campaigns that appeal to nostalgia with phrases such as 'Make America Great Again' or 'Take Back Control' appeal to a time when industry was at the centre of the economy and the community functioned around their business (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Bachman and Sidaway 2016). This, combined with the brain drain as the well-educated youth head to superdiverse cities, causes further social decline (Jennings and Stoker, 2018). In this way the deindustrialisation caused by globalisation has increased populism. Whilst this maybe shown through high unemployment as these industries leave, it's the social factors that cause the populist support, not the necessarily the economic ones.

The traditional white working class are also dying out. The new working class is now in the service industry in the superdiverse cities: waiters, fitness coaches and Uber drivers (Jennings and Stoker, 2018). They may be working class, but they are more educated than their older counter parts, and the number of university graduates has increased in both countries and over 50% of British citizens now go to university (Coughlan, 2019). As such the traditional working class is shrinking. This section of the population in both the US and UK is heavily associated with more collectivist and conformist attitudes. Indeed, studies show that people living in the superdiverse cities are less conforming (Berg, 2013; Inglehart and Norris, 2018). Some academics, such as Holbrook (2016), suggests that this means parties such as the Republican Party and the Conservative Party will do badly in the long run as their electoral base dies out. However, with the increasing saliency of post-material issues (Inglehart and Norris, 2018) and their declining numbers, the group identity for the traditional working class may become more salient. Knowles and Tropp (2018) show that the increasing threat from out-groups increases support for authoritarian politicians. One of the biggest perceived threats is that larger groups will ‘undermine their identity’ (Cox, 2017, p14). Cox shows that the populist element of the Trump and Brexit campaigns were ways for these voters to regain their identity.

This section has analysed the effects of superdiverse cities on education and the working class. These cities have become economic hubs and as such the well-educated have converged on them (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). These people are more liberal than the rest of the population and see themselves as a moral elite. They also form a large percentage of the political class causing the political class to no longer represent the demography of the nation (Spicer, 2018). These two factors cause anti-establishment sentiment to rise, resulting in an increase in populist support.

The other two factors that has been caused by the superdiverse cities is as a result of education changing to suit this new dynamic economy. This has caused more people to go to university, gaining more qualifications and a wider skill set. As such, those who have lost their jobs due to deindustrialisation but have few formal qualifications (Hochschild, 2017) are at a disadvantage in the new job market. Therefore, slogans such as ‘Make America Great Again’ appeal as they imply bringing back large industry and the communities that spawned around it. The increasing level of education in the population has also caused the traditional white working class to decline. This has caused their group identity to increase in salience. This has caused them to support national populist movements that see ‘the people’ generally

as culturally homogenous, white, and working class (Cox,2017). In these ways the formation of superdiverse cities and the effects that they have had on education has contributed to the spread of populism.

Superdiverse cities and migration

Along with education, the other main demographic change that has created these superdiverse cities is the increasing migration to them. Cities like London and New York are two of the biggest financial hubs in the world, which has been partially responsible for policies that have turned London into a ‘world city’ (Clarke and Newman, 2017, p104). These two cities are among the most diverse in the world, neither one has a majority ethnicity but are made up out of a multitude of different ethnic groups. As such legislators have put in place policies to maintain and safeguard these policies (Lynch,2019). However, these policies stem from different ideologies: multiculturalism and colour-blind ideology. Firstly, the effects of these ideologies will be analysed. Secondly, the changing migration patterns that have caused ethnocentrism to rise in the UK and US will be analysed to show how they have caused an increase in populist support.

Increasing diversity has caused two conflicting ideologies: colour-blind ideology and multiculturalism to increase their influence over public policy (Lynch, 2019). Multiculturalism sees the differences between ethnic groups in society and celebrates these differences- arguing they make society richer (Hooghe et al., 2007). Colour blindness on the other hand suggests that there are no major differences between people in society; that underneath surface differences we are all the same (Judd et al., 1995). Designing policy so it is in line with either of these ideologies is supposed to help make society more equal. However, as Judd et al., (1995) and Ryan et al. (2007) show different ethnic groups endorse different ideologies more. These studies show that in the US ethnic minorities are more multiculturalist than whites, who tend to be more colour-blind in their attitudes. Both studies suggest that this is due to minorities identifying more with their ethnicity than whites due to a history of persecution. Jardina (2019) supports this statement, showing that historically whites identify less with their ethnicity than minorities do.

Whilst multiculturalism celebrates these differences, ethnocentrism shows a ‘preference for and positive affect towards one’s ethnic or racial group relative to all others’ (Valentino et al., 2013, p150). All ethnic groups exhibit ethnocentrism (Enos, 2017) however it can differ according to groups. Judd et al. (1995) studied groups of white and African

American students and found that African American students exhibit more ethnocentric tendencies than white students. They put this down to the greater levels of multiculturalism morphing into ethnocentrism. This thesis is supported by Ryan et al. (2007).

However, whilst historically it may have been the case that whites exhibit relatively low ethnocentrism, this is not the case now. Jardina et al., (2021) show whiteness is becoming more defined as its own identity due to increasing diversity in the US. Indeed, white Americans will no longer be the majority by 2042 according to projections (Major et al., p931) and white Britons by the 2060s (Coleman, 2016). Wright (2011) supports this and goes further, stating that this will cause ethnocentrism to rise within the mainstream population. As such as diversity increases through migration, ethnocentrism should also increase. Studies have shown that ethnocentrism is linked to the relative increase of immigrants (Enos, 2017; Kauffmann, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2021). Yet, Knowles and Tropp (2018) argue that diversity can both increase and decrease ethnocentrism. They argue that proximity, widely shown to increase ethnocentrism, causes an increase in intergroup interactions which have been shown to decrease ethnocentrism. Enos (2017) puts that proximity and contact should not be conflated. Proximity will increase ethnocentrism very quickly and whilst interactions will reduce it, this process takes significantly more time. Vasilopoulos et al., (2021, p5) support this analysis, showing that votes for authoritarian and far-right parties often increase in a 'halo effect' around immigrant dense areas.

This can be clearly seen in votes for 'Leave' and Trump. In the UK, the 'Leave' vote was strongest in areas where the immigrant population had seen rapid growth (Abreu and Öner, 2020, p1439, Neal et al., 2021) and Trump's largest gains compared to Romney were where the Latino population had increased the most proportionately from 2000 to 2014 (Enos, 2017; Glaeser and Ward, 2006). This is because in the areas with an overall higher immigration population, the superdiverse cities mentioned previously, any increases in the migrant population were proportionately small compared to areas with a very small migrant population to begin with. The rapid nature of this increase has meant that the level of interactions between the indigenous population and the immigrants is limited, thus not allowing for the two groups to integrate between each other. Therefore, the backlash that comes after an influx of an outgroup had not yet subsided come the votes. (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020)

Coleman (2016) argues that the lack of preparation for the influx from A8 countries should be attributed to this. Coleman argues that this is due to the Labour government's massive underestimation of the number of immigrants that the UK would receive; therefore, making no provisions in schools, housing or hospitals for the largest inflow of migrants to Britain in its history (Coleman, 2016, p684). Therefore, when these resources were out under pressure, nationalism and ethnocentrism grew as sufficient levels of contact had not yet happened. This provides an interpretation to Colantone and Stanig's (2018) finding that only immigration from these countries was statistically significant for the distribution of 'Leave' voting areas. Fetzer (2019) supports this, showing that the UKIP vote grew the most where these resources became the scarcest when austerity started in 2010.

In the US, diversity is increasing the racial cleavage (Jardina, 2019). Increasing numbers of whites believe that they are experiencing discrimination against them and over half think that life 'is worse for people like them now than it was 50 years ago' (Pew Research Centre, 2016; cited in Sides et al., 2018)). The increasing deindustrialisation in the rustbelt juxtaposed against the wealth of the coastal cities is attributed by many as one of the main reasons Trump won (Spicer, 2018). Enos (2017) points out that converging social cleavages increase the ability to stereotype and view the world as divided separate and homogenous groups. Therefore, as these cities are both richer and more diverse, when viewed from afar, the rustbelts in this case, this gives rise to the perception that immigrants are winning a zero-sum game, the reason behind claims such as immigrants are stealing jobs (Rodrik, 2017). This produces rises in ethnocentrism and nationalism in these areas as they protect against the outgroup (Jardina, 2019). These two ideologies, like populism, divide society into groups. Therefore, it is easy for populism, a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004), to attach itself to them and is why increasing ethnocentrism is combined with increasing populism. As both of these ideologies view the superdiverse cities and their populations as 'the other' then these ideologies are mutually beneficial for each other.

The second section looked at how changing levels of education and migration have influenced the spread of populism. Whilst there are other differences between the super diverse cities such as London, New York and Los Angeles and the rest of the US and UK, this section has shed light on these two areas due to their wide-ranging effects. The first part of this section examined the effects of the convergence of the well-educated on these cities and the effects this has had on the working class. The convergence of the well-educated combined with the increasing salience of post-material issues has caused a moral elite to form

that is much more liberal than the majority (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, Browning, 2019). This new urban and professional class also form the majority of political class, meaning the political class no longer represents the majority of the population (Spicer, 2018). This was shown to have spread discontent and anti-establishment sentiment leading to populism (Robertson, 2021).

The effects that this convergence of the well-educated on the superdiverse cities had on the working class was also analysed. This convergence has led to the decline of the working class, which has already suffered through the deindustrialisation caused by globalisation. However, it was the desocialisation and de-collectivisation that was emphasised here. As Neal et al., (2021) point out, communities can form around industries, so as deindustrialisation has gone, so has the community with it (Clarke and Newman, 2017). This has been intensified by the convergence of the well-educated on the superdiverse hubs and has caused further decline. When combined with an increasing clash of cultures between the older, generally white, working class who are more traditional and this new, liberal professional class, then it is not difficult to see how populism support can grow.

Diversity too has been a big factor in the creation of the superdiverse cities. Increasing diversity has caused both multiculturalism and ethnocentrism to grow, the former in an attempt to reduce inequalities between groups (Ryan et al., 2007); the latter due to increasing minorities causing the majority to feel under threat (Enos, 2017; Jardina 2019). The deindustrialisation combined with the economic inequality caused the saliency of these feelings to increase, giving rise to ethnocentric nationalism (Rodrik, 2017). Due to populism's requirement to latch onto another (Mudde,2004) and the discontent being directed at those living in the superdiverse cities, making any increase in ethnocentrism or populism benefit the other. It is in these ways that the formation of superdiverse cities has caused an increase in populism in the US and UK.

Conclusion

This paper has shown evidence that the formation of superdiverse cities has coincided and given rise to surges of populism in the US and UK. This is due to two main factors: the convergence of the well-educated on these cities and the increasing ethnic minority population. This was presented in two sections. The first addressed the debate between the cultural backlash thesis and financial hardship thesis. Instead of these theses operating

exclusively of each other, this first section argued that they should be used in conjunction with each other in order to fully understand the causes of the recent surges in populism.

On this basis, the second section of the paper analysed the effects that the formation of superdiverse cities has had on populism. This section posited that a convergence of the well-educated combined with the increasing ethnic minority population has provided the activation that populism can require. The effects of these two both in influencing the relationship between the superdiverse cities and the wider country, and more generally are profound. The convergence of the well-educated has caused a new professional and liberal class to form. This class produces the vast majority of the political class (Spicer, 2018). As such, most of the population are not adequately represented in politics. This, combined with the highly progressive views of this class has caused anti-establishment sentiment to rise against this out of touch urban elite (Browning, 2019).

The increasing ethnic minority population also causes an increase in populism due to the increasing ethnocentrism that it gives rise to. Whilst increasing diversity undoubtedly brings many benefits to society, it can also cause the declining majority to feel threatened, increase their levels of identity in their ethnic group- in turn causing a rise in ethnocentrism. When groups feel threatened, they often turn to authoritarian measures (Enos 2017). It is posited that this ethnocentrism causes nationalistic and populist tendencies to also rise in hopes of protecting the in-group from harm (Jardina, 2019). It is also posited that as this increasing minority population is also centre around these superdiverse cities that this ethnocentrism can intensify the populist sentiment already directed towards these global hubs. In these ways, it has been argued, that the increasing ethnic minority population can cause populism to increase.

This paper has put forward an argument as to how social demographic change has caused an increase in population. However, this paper is limited in several ways. The first is that, due to its nature as a literature review, it does not provide any new evidence as to how these social demographic changes cause an increase in populism. Nor has it shown whether the theoretical links shown here are statistically significant, instead relying on the statistical analysis of other articles. Further research along these veins would shed further light on whether these demographic changes have indeed influenced the growth of populism. In addition, the paper focusses primarily on the US and UK, specifically in the period before the Brexit and Trump elections. An analysis of a wider time frame or a larger set of countries

would allow for the discovery of universal trends that has been outside the scope of this paper.

What is within the scope of this paper, however, is to suggest potential ways to prevent or at least inhibit the recent populist surges from happening in the future. The first suggestion is that the concentration of business, culture and politics in the superdiverse cities should be dispersed. This should be done by increasing the ability for more areas in both the US and UK to facilitate these in the same capacity. This would cause the well-educated to disperse around the country and stop them from converging in a small area. The ‘Levelling Up’ campaign that the current Conservative Party is facilitating is a step in the right direction although it is too early to tell what the effects of this should be. Policies that also promote the integration of all cultures should also be supported. This is not to say that all cultures should be dismissed for the sake of one overarching culture, but that more should be done to increase the interpersonal contact between different ethnic groups. The increased number of interactions that this would cause would reduce the ethnocentrism present in all ethnic groups; hopefully as they realise that they are more similar to each other than they first seem. These two suggestions would reduce all of the issues that are caused by the presence of the superdiverse cities and as such would reduce the populist sentiment that this paper argues they have caused.

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